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ABSTRACT:  Samuel Butler, a contemporary critic of Charles Darwin, proffered an alternative, 
vitalistic account of evolution. At the same time, he put into question all modern naturalistic 
treatments of this fundamental idea which presuppose that evolution is mainly a scientific 
problem. On the contrary, Butler in effect insists, this extremely vague idea calls for not an 
`explanation' but rather a fairly comprehensive, plausible story that helps elucidate an 
inherently complex idea. Butler can thus be read as outlining an anthropomorphic 
metaphorics that evokes a living Cosmos wherein it might be possible to do justice to the 
problem which Darwin left unresolved---the problem of heredity. In this picture of the Cosmos 
Butler links the fundamental notion of organization not to the allegedly universal and 
immutable `laws of nature,' as the moderns would have it, but rather to dynamically evolving 
relationships between only more or less stable habits. The variations in extant habits that 
emergence elicits are moreover the products of quasi-intelligent responses to new challenges 
from the environment. For Butler follows Lamarck in holding that all organisms possess 
powers capable of responding to felt needs and/or desires to make alterations in the habits (or 
instincts) that characterize their modes of existence. He thus in the end effectively bequeaths to 
his readers a challenge to extend and amplify, if possible, his outline of a promising 
metaphysical imaginary that can take into account some highly unorthodox conjectures.  
Keywords: Evolution; experience; Samuel Butler; Darwinism; Lamarckism; vagueness; 
vitalism; variation; heredity; metaphysics; metaphorics 
1. IS EVOLUTION REALLY A SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM?  
There are numerous reasons for thinking that in order to make sense of the idea of 
evolution it is necessary to first map a broad avenue of escape from the tyranny of 
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neo-Darwinism.1 This means, for one thing, finding a way around current tendencies 
to restrict the discussion of evolution to futile debates that pit Darwinism against   
Creationism. It is not, however, that adherents to either doctrine should be dismissed 
as completely wrong-headed, for who could deny that the drama of Nature is infused 
with struggles for survival in which the weaker tend to be displaced by the stronger? 
Nor can it be denied that chance is one of the more inescapable facts of life. Or that 
the existence of a certain creativity in Nature, for that matter, is indicated by the very 
desire to understand the existence of creative, questioning minds. The point is that it 
is highly doubtful whether any sort of justice can be done to the complexity inherent 
in the extremely vague idea of evolution (for it manifestly encapsulates a number of 
other very obscure ideas, such as emergence, variation, heredity, and so on) by 
clinging to a single-minded, self-restricting mode of thought.   
The longevity of the neo-Darwinian paradigm, in other words, ought to prompt a 
general concern about what sort of cultural forces might explain a self-consciously 
rational society to institute what on the face of it is a highly simplistic approach to a 
very complex idea. One may suspect, in other words, that at the heart of the debate 
over evolution there dwells a highly questionable conception of what a truly rational 
explanation might look like. This has fostered a misguided belief about what role 
science actually plays in the advance of understanding. For if one grants that every 
culture has its own way of selecting and expressing what it takes to be Nature's 
principal characteristics, it is not hard to think that nature and culture are 
indissociable complementary notions. And that no allegedly scientific account of some 
aspect of the naturing of Nature can proceed very far without alluding, if only silently, 
to some perhaps questionable myths that may be undermining the `culturing' of that 
culture.'2    
As for what sort of myth might account for the remarkable ascendancy of 
Darwinism, it does not seem incidental that those who stray from the straight and 
1  The term neo-Darwinian, as I shall use it, applies to those who hold that evolution can be accounted 
for in terms of two simple principles---chance and natural selection. This does not include Darwin 
himself, according to G. J. Romanes (in Darwin, and After Darwin) who holds that Darwin believed that 
although natural selection was the main means of modification, it needed to be augmented with other 
causes. Or as some `Darwinians' might put it, other mechanisms. Whether the word `other' requires a 
vitalistic or a mechanistic augmentation of the principle of natural selection is thus a central issue in the 
debate over whether a Darwinian approach to evolution is even reasonable. 
2 Cf. Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern. Following his lead, my references to `Nature' should, 
strictly speaking, be understood as referring to  a certain nature-culture (chiefly that of the so-called West) 
since every culture evolves its own set of fundamental notions and discursive means for expressing what 
the authorities deem to be the most salient characteristics of natural events and acceptable ways of 
referring to them.  
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narrow channel marked `chance plus natural selection' are liable to be accused of 
being anti-science. Yet modern naturalists can themselves be charged with being anti-
rational inasmuch as they have merely hi-jacked the name of naturalism by assuming 
that science is in the best position to reply to the perennial question `What is Nature?' 
For very few modern naturalists pay much attention to the over-arching problem of 
what meaning should be assigned to this pivotal idea, never mind attempting to trace 
the provenance of the insights and intuitions which inform this culture's  preferred 
choice of fundamental ideas about it.  
Maintaining that no claim relating to the question of what is really going on in the 
natural world ought to be accepted as sound or reasonable if it cannot be backed up 
by `hard' science, modern naturalists thus blithely conflate the idea of natural 
philosophy with science, thereby leaving themselves free to conflate evolution with 
Darwinism.3 Hence the very popularity of the neo-Darwinian view of evolution can 
be cited as evidence of a self-deceptive collective mentality that in the name of 
rigorous `hard-headed' thinking perpetuates, ironically enough, the apparently 
widespread myth of scientific super-rationality.4 For this myth allows would-be 
rational inquirers to avoid completely the need to confront the extreme vagueness of 
such fundamental ideas as evolution, which surely refers in the first instance to one of 
the more salient characteristics of Nature.  
That is to say, in brief, the situation warrants a suspicion to the effect that the 
alleged special capacity of scientists to think with open, disinterested, and self-critical 
minds is not to be trusted, especially whenever what is at issue concerns the meanings 
of fundamental ideas. Put another way, the ascendancy of  neo-Darwinism may have 
long since prefigured a degenerate collective mentality that has allowed itself to 
become  mesmerized by the undoubted `progress' of modern techno-science. For the 
3 See, e.g., Sahotra Sarkar, Doubting Darwin?: Creationist  Designs on Evolution (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007). 
Sarker, speaking in the name of methodological naturalism, is primarily intent on defending evolutionary 
biology from what he calls ID creationism which he thinks is generally an attempt to introduce `the 
divine' into accounts of evolution. As for the meaning of naturalism, Sarkar defines it as the claim that 
`all that exists in the universe is processes and entities knowable to us through scientific methods, that is 
through logic and our senses, with no recourse to entities and processes entirely inaccessible to these 
methods' (p. 4).  
4 Consider, for instance, the concerted aim to overcome the ubiquity of vagueness by logicistic methods. 
This project has been one of the more influential contributions to twentieth century philosophy of self-
consciously rational, positivistic thinkers who betray an acritical, unspoken faith in the myth of scientific 
superrationality. See my Myths of Reason: Vagueness, Rationality, and the Lure of Logic (Atlantic Highlands, N.J: 
Humanities Press, 1995), passim. 
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upshot has been a tendency to conflate this specialized form of practical inquiry with 
metaphysics itself.5   
This situation may even bear witness to a deep-rooted, debilitating fear of the 
vagueness that is characteristic of most (all?) of our fundamental ideas about Nature. 
This fear is perhaps most in evidence in the reception accorded to those who dare to 
stray from what is essentially a quasi-religious orthodoxy. For the fervid defenders of 
the Darwinian approach too evolution have very little patience for dissenters.6 
Perhaps this fear also betrays a subconscious awareness of size of the upheaval that 
may result from taking too close a look at the metaphysical problems presented by  
vague fundamental ideas. That the consequences might even be revolutionary from a 
cultural point of view is in fact not too hard to see. For the principle of natural 
selection, when couched in the form of the doctrine of the `survival of the fittest,' 
underwrites (as many socially concerned thinkers have pointed out) a callous social 
Darwinism which appears to underwrite a destructive and imperialistic, globalizing 
form of capitalism.  
In any case, the required readjustment that the collective mentality of this culture  
might find it has to undergo would certainly put at risk the great investment in time, 
effort, and reputation that has led to the ascendancy of Darwinism. Indeed, the 
upheaval might be so radical as to force thinkers all kinds of to take seriously the 
apparently heretical notion that Nature is not only inherently sentient but also self-
creative. Worse still, it might bring out the urgency of the need to come to terms with  
an even more unsettling possibility---that the term `reality' refers not to a solid 
material universe but rather to a fluid moral Cosmos.   
There are a number of discomfiting reasons, in short, for thinking that it is high 
time to take a closer look at creationism (with a small “c”). As for how one might best 
5 Sarkar, for example, is not atypical in wanting to have his cake and eat it, since he grounds his defence 
of Darwinism in a `metaphysical naturalism'---where metaphysics, he says, can be understood as 
consisting `of a set of fundamental assumptions supposed to be respected by all admissible scientific 
theories' (p. 152). The point is that metaphysics is more fairly characterized as an inquiry into the 
fundamental assumptions themselves.  
6  Consider, for instance, the passionate and acerbic denunciations of Rupert Sheldrake's  A New Science of 
Life which was described in a review in the prestigious journal Nature as fit only for burning. But  
Sheldrake is putting forward a closely argued alternative to the neo-Darwinian association of variation 
with chance which is based on the ideas of morphogenetic fields and morphic resonance. This quite 
detailed theory promises to throw some light on that aspect of inheritance which involves the creation 
and transmission of characteristic but changeable patterns and rhythms from generation to generation. It 
is worth noting that Sheldrake recognizes the looming presence of metaphysics whenever the discussion 
of evolution touches on the issue of emergence. He believes, however, that a proper theory of evolution 
ought to be causally based; that is, it ought to allow for the sort of testing that a supposedly genuine 
scientfic theory needs to undergo before it can be recognized as properly scientific.    
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do this, it seems the non-scientistic naturalist would be wise to approach the idea of 
evolution with some fairly uncontroversial observations, such as that whatever else 
might be entailed, evolution is concerned with the central themes of Life and 
Thought. And these evidently point to the existence of certain `quicknesses' in the 
`naturing of Nature.' That the latter phrase is both unorthodox and extremely vague 
need trouble only those who have difficulty acknowledging the essentially dynamic 
nature of evolution, that it alludes to a world in process of continually making and re-
making itself.  
However, it is just at this point that one might begin to suspect that the topic of 
evolution should not even be on science's explanatory agenda. Indeed, why think that 
scientists can tell us much more than that evolution is a virtual certainty on account of 
the great mass of evidence that it has gathered in many different fields of specialized 
inquiry? In any event, the would-be nonmodern naturalist might well want to begin 
again from scratch with the rough idea that evolution generally alludes  to a complex 
network of synchronically and diachronically changing relationships within and 
between organized forms of matter. Or better perhaps, shifting relationships between 
the `matterings of matter' and the `mindings of mind.'  For it is no small thing that the 
moderns are wont to use the well-worn notions of matter and mind, which are almost 
as vague as the idea of Nature, as though everyone understood perfectly well what 
they mean.  
But to begin thus with a certain skepticism concerning the aims and illusions of 
modern naturalism is to begin by contemplating a cosmic activity that might well be 
called the `naturing of Nature.' Objections to this sort of beginning only strengthen 
the suspicion that the moderns have instituted a self-serving conception of rationality 
which, as Nietzsche pointed out long ago, betrays a desire to constrain `serious' 
thinking to narrow perspectives. He in fact goes further and accuses the moderns of 
making thought itself subservient to a form of  `conceptual idolatry.' Having thus 
articulated what I am claiming is a matter of considerable urgency, he also confirms 
that the problem of nature is bound up with the problem of culture. For he diagnoses 
a sick culture that has over-estimated the scope of capacity to understand the world. 
Since this attitude of mind threatens to hasten the demise of this so-called enlightened 
civilization, a remedy is urgently needed, one that can cure a degenerate form of 
thought that protects and promotes itself by instituting an endemic self-deception. 
Nietzsche's recommendation is that philosophers ought to learn to become cultural 
physicians. To this end, he proposes that they become conversant with the imaginal 
thinking of artists. For the only way to overcome the deeply entrenched assumption 
that perpetuates the myth that truly `serious' thinking means a sober, rigorous, and 
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systematic scientific quest for `the truth,' is to frankly acknowledge that no quest for 
enlightenment can rely upon anything much more substantial than a `movable host of 
metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms.’7  
2. WHY PAY ATTENTION TO SAMUEL BUTLER?  
That the above remarks bear directly on the too-often begged question of how to tell 
an adequate and reasonably plausible story about evolution is nicely illustrated by 
Samuel Butler. While being a contemporary and erstwhile admirer of Darwin, he 
became one of his most severe and unrelenting critics. It is thus worth stressing that 
Butler was not, and never had any desire to be regarded as, a recognized member of 
some accredited scientific discipline with a detailed knowledge of the relevant `facts.' 
But neither did he have a hard-won reputation to protect. The value of his writings on 
evolution, in other words, stem from his sensitivity to cultural forces that work to 
restrict the freedom of thinkers to explore an extremely vague idea that he believed 
was being unjustly dealt with by the acknowledged scientific experts.   
Recorded in no less than four exploratory books, Butler's wide-ranging reflections 
on the topic of evolution thus put into question not only the basic assumptions of the 
neo-Darwinian theory of evolution.8 Even more importantly, all his writings raise 
crucial questions that bear directly on how best to think about the relations between 
Life and Thought. So although he was on the whole ignored by most of his scientific 
contemporaries, Butler can at least be praised for introducing his non-scientific 
readers to a number of highly relevant considerations that ought to be of interest to 
everyone. 
On the face of it, then, Butler's intent is only partly to show that the Darwinian 
approach to evolution is seriously inadequate. For it is worth stressing that he has no 
quarrel with the main tenets of neo-Darwinian theory. He is not rejecting the basic 
7  See his essay “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” in Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's 
Notebooks of the early 1870's, ed. & trans. Daniel Breazeale (N J.: Humanities Press, 1979, p. 84. I discuss this 
pivotal topic (of what constitutes a truly rational explanation) at greater length in my Process, Reality, and 
the Power of Symbols: Thinking with A. N. Whitehead (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008). (Hereafter 
referred to as PRPS). My conclusion here is that the best that philosophy can hope to achieve is a life-
enhancing addition to what Gilles Deleuze suggestively likens to a growing collage in painting. What 
follows can therefore be regarded as an attempt to illustrate this view of philosophy. 
8 The titles of these books are Life and Habit (1878); Evolution, Old and New (1879);  Unconscious Memory (1880); 
and Luck, or Cunning? (1887). While copies of these books are not readily available, they can all be found 
online, in ebook editions, at Project Gutenberg:  <www.gutenberg.org>.  
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claims that chance and natural selection play significant roles in evolution.9 Indeed, 
who could deny that the unpredictable course of life is buffeted on all sides by 
unexpected contingencies? Nor is it hard to believe that life tout court is at the mercy of 
`weeding-out' processes that tend to eliminate the weak, the unprepared, and the 
maladapted.  
Yet `there is a fallacy running through almost all Mr. Darwin’s work,' says Butler; 
namely, that ` “natural selection” is a theory (if, indeed, it can be a theory at all), in 
some way accounting for the origin of variation, and so of species' (Life and Habit). 
Indeed, it certainly seems undeniable that if something happens to survive in the 
struggles for life, it has managed to slip, as it were, through the sieve of natural 
selection. Therefore it has not been `selected out.' The punctilious logical thinker 
might therefore be inclined to say that it has been `selected in.' Thus natural selection 
is manifestly an essentially scientific principle.  
The skeptic, however, might at this point protest that it is also a remarkably 
convenient one. There appear to be few so-called `emergent properties' of evolved  
organisms that lie outside its purview. Even consciousness has been described as an 
emergent property of the brain. The principle of natural selection has moreover been 
enlisted to explain the emergence of those `immaterial' concerns that fill human 
thought with such ethereal notions as `morality' or `aesthetics.' That is, with concerns 
that extend well beyond the practical or material ones that pertain to the physical 
struggle for survival.10   
On this particular score, then, Butler is quite clear: anyone who trumpets the 
sufficiency of the principle of natural selection is only covering over the real 
difficulties. These involve showing how to give a just and honest account of the 
phenomenon of inheritance, the central core of which is the fact of variation.  
More specifically, the principle of natural selection cannot, Butler insists, `induce 
variability,' for it is `only able to accumulate what - on the occasion of each successive 
variation, and so during the whole process - must have been originated by something 
else.' Thus identifying what is surely the central enigma around which the idea of 
evolution revolves, for Darwin himself at times alludes to the need to take into 
9 Although highly critical of Darwin's philosophical observations, Butler is full of praise for his diligent 
gathering of evidence for evolution: `...to the end of time, if the question be asked, “Who taught people 
to believe in evolution?” there can only be one answer - that it was Mr. Darwin.' Life and Habit. 
10 Consider, for instance, those attempts to account for the emergence in the human organism of 
aesthetic, religious, ethical, and moral concerns. Many neo-Darwinians attempt to `explain' their 
existence in terms of the alleged adaptive advantage they lend to this particular organism in its struggles 
to survive.  
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account this obscure `something else,' Butler explicitly refers to those aspects of 
evolution which every thinking layperson sooner or later pauses to contemplate: 
When we see organs, or living tools—for there is no well-developed organ of any 
living being which is not used by its possessor as an instrument or tool for the 
effecting of some purpose which he considers or has considered for his 
advantage—when we see living tools which are as admirably fitted for the work 
required of them, ….Shall we hold that they must have been designed or 
contrived, not perhaps by mental processes indistinguishable from those by 
which the carpenter's saw or the watch has been designed, but still by processes 
so closely resembling these that no word can be found to express the facts of the 
case so nearly as the word "design"? That is to say, shall we imagine that they 
were arrived at by a living mind as the result of scheming and contriving, and 
thinking (not without occasional mistakes) which of the courses open to it 
seemed best fitted for the occasion, or are we to regard the apparent connection 
between such an organ, we will say, as the eye, and the sight which is affected by 
it, as in no way due to the design or plan of a living intelligent being, but as 
caused simply by the accumulation, one upon another, of an almost infinite 
series of small pieces of good fortune? Evolution, Old and New. 
Butler is highly sympathetic, in short, to the feelings of wonder or awe that most 
thoughtful people experience from time to time, until their efforts to think the matter 
through are swamped by doctrinaire pronouncements. Yet it is not all that hard to 
believe that all organisms are infused with quasi-conscious, quasi-intelligent, 
purposeful aims that at bottom may account for the development of such wonderful 
organs as eyes; organs which, in their various guises, turn out to be just what is needed 
in order for an organism to cope with its own special living-conditions.   
3. ON BUTLER'S NON-MODERN NATURALISM  
At this point we come close to the center of the puzzle that Butler thinks presents the 
would-be naturalist with his/her greatest challenge. Among the few who have risen to 
this challenge, there is one figure who stands out with special prominence: 
According to Lamarck there is a broad principle which underlies variation 
generally, and this principle is the power which all living beings possess of 
slightly varying their actions in accordance with varying needs, coupled with the 
fact observable throughout nature that use develops, and disuse enfeebles an 
organ, and that the effects, whether of use or disuse, become hereditary after 
many generations.11 
11 Evolution, Old and New. Butler notes that Lamarck aims only to give an outline of the general situation, 
one that is based on the principle that `sense of need is the main direct cause of variation, and ...that the 
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However, Butler's endorsement of what he takes to be Lamarck's principal 
assumption appears to have made little impression on Darwin and his followers, for 
reasons that are perhaps not too surprising, given the range of difficulties that are 
involved. Having the writings of Erasmus Darwin, Buffon, Geoffroy, as well as 
Lamarck in mind, he observes:    
It is easy to understand the difficulty felt by the fathers of evolution when we 
remember how much had to be seen before the facts could lie well before them. 
It was necessary to attain, firstly, to a perception of the unity of person between 
parents and offspring in successive generations; secondly, it must be seen that an 
organism's memory goes back for generations beyond its birth, to the first 
beginnings in fact, of which we know anything whatever; thirdly, the latency of 
that memory, as of memory generally till the associated ideas are reproduced, 
must be brought to bear upon the facts of heredity; and lastly, the 
unconsciousness with which habitual actions come to be performed, must be 
assigned as the explanation of the unconsciousness with which we grow and 
discharge most of our natural functions. Evolution, Old and New.  
However, as I have earlier indicated, the range of difficulties is considerably 
broader than the above remarks suggest. Although scientists have succeeded in 
establishing evolution as a virtual `fact' of Nature, self-styled naturalists have notably 
refused to acknowledge that the problem of evolution needs to be viewed within a 
cosmic perspective. Butler appears to recognize this since his story-telling indicates 
that he can be regarded as aiming to become a `true naturalist' in the sense outlined 
by another systematically ignored thinker, the philosopher-poet, S. T. Coleridge. 
Likewise repelled by what he took to be a pseudo-naturalistic mode of thought (which 
presupposes that the `naturing of Nature' can be properly and justly explicated under 
the aegis of the de-vitalizing metaphysics of mechanistic materialism), Coleridge set 
out to show that the modern presumption that reasoning that ought to move in 
accordance with scientific norms which provide the model for good reasoning tout court 
is a false and morally pernicious belief. As a remedial measure he explicitly urges the 
adoption of a highly unorthodox principle of rationality---one that generally decrees 
that reason ought never to ontologically divide what can only be conceptually 
distinguished.  
Coleridge can therefore be counted as a leader in that tiny company of 
philosophical therapists that Nietzsche invokes and among whom, I am suggesting, 
Butler deserves to be counted. Coleridge envisages the emergence of a more just and 
variations thus engendered are inherited, so that divergences accumulate and result in species and 
genera...'. Acknowledging that there is much left to be done, Butler adds that Lamarck himself was 
`indifferent to further details.'  
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honest collective mentality which will strive toward framing a truly rational form of 
reasoning capable of fostering a `true realism.'12 As for what the little word `true' 
might signify, it is not just a little ironic that in respect to the crucial question of what 
is or is not reasonable in philosophizing about Nature, Coleridge has since received 
important support from advances in modern physics. Quantum physics, in particular, 
has shown that the vague term `matter' refers not to a sort of `universal stuff' but 
rather to a great variety of forms of substantial activity. The upshot is, as I have 
already indicated, that one might better speak of the `matterings of matter.' A similar 
caveat applies to thinking since quantum physics also reveals that it is an egregious 
error to assume that knowers can be sharply divided from what they know.  
In short, then, Coleridge has been vindicated in his insistence that thinking is an 
activity (which I have referred to above as minding) and that  `subjects' should never 
be radically separated from their perceived `objects.' Thus both he and Butler  elicit a 
rough image of the cosmos in which the `naturing of Nature'  refers to a dynamic 
interweaving of inter-connected processes of minding-mattering.13 For Butler not only 
suggests that he is a true naturalist in Coleridge's sense in that he assumes that life 
itself is somehow a primordial characteristic of the Cosmos, he holds that the organic 
should not be radically divorced from the inorganic: 
The only thing of which I am sure is, that the distinction between the organic 
and inorganic is arbitrary; that it is more coherent with our other ideas, and 
therefore more acceptable, to start with every molecule as a living thing, and 
then deduce death as the breaking up of an association or corporation, than to 
start with inanimate molecules and smuggle life into them; and that, therefore, 
what we call the inorganic world must be regarded as up to a certain point 
living, and instinct, within certain limits, with consciousness, volition, and power 
of concerted action. Unconscious Memory.  
Although he adds that `[i]t is only of late...that I have come to this opinion,' this 
general assumption nonetheless appears to silently inform a good deal of his inquiries 
into the meaning of evolution. So it is worth stressing that Butler never denies the 
usefulness of distinguishing between the organic and the inorganic for the sake of 
exposition---the expression `up to a certain point' signals only his refusal to endorse 
12 See Chapter 5 of my Process, Reality, and the Power of Symbols: Thinking with A. N. Whitehead (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2008). 
13 Coleridge explicitly endorses the distinction made by the premoderns between natura naturans and natura 
naturata, where the latter term alludes to what is actually produced during the ongoing `naturing of 
Nature.' This is the province of science, which faces backward to the past; which in Coleridge's view 
means that its proper field of study is the dead.  
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the modern faith that it is possible to draw a sharp line separating these two 
fundamental characteristics of Nature.  
 
In this one crucial respect, then, Butler's reflections on evolution can be described 
as quintessentially nonmodern since they can be viewed as running parallel to 
Coleridge's quest for a `true naturalism.' This quest is moreover founded upon the 
belief that the chief guide for reason should not be Aristotelian logic but rather a 
`polar logic.' That is, a non-orthodox type of reasoning which amounts essentially to 
an artful dialectic marked by a principled refusal to violate the indissociability of 
certain fundamental conceptual contrasts.  
But before becoming more deeply immersed in the implications of this crucial  
point, it is worth stressing that Butler is by no means denying that `exact' science can 
tell us many important things about evolution. It is just that one of the main 
implications of the Lamarckian approach is that the contributions that science can 
make to the debate are strictly limited. That is to say, science may well speak with 
authority about the implications of, for instance, certain experimental results 
pertaining to the inorganic or immaterial side of evolutionary processes, but they have 
no special authority to speak about the `quickened' side of the `naturing of Nature.'  
In respect, then, to the question of how Butler needs to be read, I am claiming 
that it is of utmost importance to keep in mind that he is attempting in general to steer 
an inevitably uncertain and risky course between the Scylla of Darwinism and the 
Charybdis of natural theology.14 To this end, he takes as his chief guide the extremely 
vague image of a living Cosmos in which `Nature' alludes to a complex, ever-
changing assemblage of inter-related and interacting organisms which exhibit varying 
degrees of sentience. There is therefore no easy way to assess the worth of his many 
conjecturings, or even to say which ones are most central to his story about evolution. 
Everything hinges on whether or not his response to the crucial methodological 
question---how to go about telling a truly naturalistic story about evolution---is in fact 
a reasonable and an adequate one.  
Such a story, he declares in effect, can only be `grounded' in certain insights 
and/or intuitions that are available to everyone. As for how to go about trying to tell a 
14 `It may well be we shall find we have escaped from one set of taskmasters to fall into the hands of 
others far more ruthless. The tyranny of the Church is light in comparison with that which future 
generations may have to undergo at the hands of the doctrinaires....The so-called man of science...seems 
now generally inclined to make light of all knowledge, save of the pioneer character. His ideal is in self-
conscious knowledge....He is but medicine-man, augur, priest, in its latest development; useful it may be, 
but requiring to be well watched by those who value freedom. Wait till he has become more powerful, 
and note the vagaries which his conceit of knowledge will indulge in.' Life and Habit.  
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plausible and adequate story about inheritance, he evidently believes that this calls for 
an adventurous exploration of the complicated relationships that tie certain key tropes 
together. So the question of what exactly Butler's story amounts to is not at all easy to 
answer. Nor does it seem worth trying. But this is not to say that he rejects the 
common belief that an aim to give a satisfactory account of some aspect of the 
naturing of Nature ought to observe the chief characteristics or touchstones of would-
be rational discourse; namely, coherence and consistency.  
The important point is, in respect to the question of adequacy, that this touches 
not only upon upon the `rightness' of his initial choice of a metaphorical basis for his 
reasonings. It also raises the more general question of the extent to which his general 
approach can resolve some of the more profound puzzles locked up in the idea of 
evolution. Hence I shall initially proceed as though Butler is mainly bent on 
overcoming the most pernicious assumptions that are propagated by most Darwinians 
who evidently believe that the living can be conjured out of the dead and that 
minding can be derived from mindlessness.  
So it also needs to be stressed that there is nothing in my discussion that is meant 
to throw doubt on the manifest usefulness of the abstract tools of logic and 
mathematics in detailed investigations of the spatio-temporal aspects of the `naturing 
of Nature.' Since mathematics can be defined as the science of rhythms and patterns, 
it may well be capable of throwing important light on the significant differences that 
exist between the types of structuring and modes of behaviour that living organisms 
manifestly illustrate. It is just that Butler indicates quite clearly that a mathematical 
approach to evolution is very likely strictly limited in so far as Life itself vaguely 
alludes to an ineffable `quickness' that will forever elude capture in some formal or 
conceptual net.  
In what follows, then, I shall assume in particular that Butler is best read as 
showing the primacy of the need to renounce the  modern temptation to endorse 
common dichotomies, such as body and mind, organic and inorganic, material and 
immaterial, and so on. Indeed, he quotes with apparent approval one of Lamarck's 
observations concerning the mutual interaction of bodies and minds:   
The effect of the body upon the mind has been already sufficiently recognized; 
not so that of the mind upon the body itself. The two, one in the outset though 
they were, interact upon each other more and more the more they present the 
appearance of having become widely sundered, and it can be shown that each is 
continually modifying the other and causing it to vary. Evolution,Old and New.15 
15 Butler thus appears to anticipate recent developments in molecular genetics which belie, for instance,  
Weismann's claim that acquired habits cannot affect germ plasma. Marcus Hartog, for instance, while 
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That this statement has great significance for Butler (whose attempt to account for 
heredity is bound up closely with the trope of memory) is indicated by one of his 
concluding remarks: 
I can conceive of no matter which is not able to remember a little, and which is 
not living in respect of what it can remember. I do not see how action of any 
kind is conceivable without the supposition that every atom retains a memory of 
certain antecedents. Unconscious Memory. 
4. ON BUTLER'S ENTANGLED METAPHORICS 
Butler's writings on evolution evidence, in short, an acute awareness of some ancient 
philosophical problems that ultimately show that it is far from clear how best to 
understand the relations between apparent contraries---which is a question that 
Heraclitus long ago raised and famously linked to the idea a world in flux whose 
proper understanding calls for well-cultivated souls. Pending a closer look at the 
problem of how to reconcile immaterial considerations with material ones, it is first 
worth noting that Butler is far from casting doubt on the early moderns assumption 
that there is a certain order in Nature. That is to say, he is merely denying that all 
forms of ordering or organization in Nature are governed by the universal, eternal, 
and immutable `laws of Nature.'  
Indeed, if one assumes that the general idea of evolution elicits a cosmic 
movement whereby all forms of organization (in the guise of living organisms) are 
capable of undergoing significant alterations, the first question the would-be naturalist 
needs to address is: `Changes in what exactly?' Butler's response is unequivocal: 
changes in the extant habits of organization (or species-typical forms of structuring 
and behaving) that characterize the differences between the various species of 
organisms that actually populate the world.  
The trope of habit is a principal keystone,  in other words, in Butler's constructive 
account of variation, for a habit that cannot be varied is not a habit. But like all 
foundation stones, it is not the only or most important one. Without it, however, it 
noting that this is a problem for Butler's account of evolution (in an introduction to Unconscious Memory) 
asks: `How can we...speak of “memory” in a germ-cell which has been screened from the experiences of 
the organism, which is too simple in structure to realise them if it were exposed to them?' For an 
informed response to this particular objection, see, e.g., Mae-Wan Ho's article “Evolution,” in 
Comparative Psychology, a Handbook, G. Greenberg and M. M. Haraway, eds. (Garland Publishing, 
1998, pp. 107-19). Or see,  “Epigenetic Inheritance through  Sperm Cells, the Lamarckian Dimension in 
Evolution,” Dr. Mae-Wan Ho, ISIS: `New findings on the molecular mechanisms whereby epigenetic 
changes acquired during development can be transmitted to the next generation via sperm cells are 
vindicating Lamarck’s theory of evolution that had been completely eclipsed by Darwin’s followers for 
over a century.'  
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would not be possible to begin a Lamarckian train of thought in which significant 
variations bespeak a hidden power or powers to effect changes in extant 
organizational habits in response to felt needs and/or challenges from the 
environment. This description of the situation implies, however, that the trope of 
habit is bound up tightly with the equally key notion of power. That is to say, a 
process of variation alludes to a power or powers that introduce inheritable alterations 
or augmentations in chains of species-typical habits, or species-typical memories. 
One can thus say that the standard question (and objection) that is usually 
prompted by the mere mention of the name of Lamarck---whether acquired 
characteristics can be inherited---becomes, in Butler's hands, simply otiose. For what 
else could an acquired characteristic be except an augmentation of a given chain of 
species-typical habits that invite the use of the trope of memory? But inasmuch as 
Butler's account of the role that memory plays in heredity tends to raise more 
questions than it answers, this aspect of his story is not easy to recount. For it is not 
clear how to approach the task of elucidating the intricate connections that tie the 
notions of habit and power tightly to the obscure idea of `unconscious memory.' The 
adjective itself indicates that there may be no way to avoid the arresting consideration 
that Butler is eliciting at this point an intrinsically occult idea.  
It is conceivable, for one thing, that the power or powers which initiate variations 
may be capable of envisaging new and better structures or patterns of behaviour that 
may lead to improvements in chances for survival. Yet Butler's interpretation of 
unconscious memory seems essentially static, as it were, since he accounts for this idea 
in terms of the kind of memory exemplified by an accomplished pianist, say, who in 
performing a complicated piece of music (which does not leave enough time for a 
note-by-note reading) that the music itself has been somehow bodily incorporated by 
means of frequent practice.16 That is to say, unconscious memory alludes to the fact 
that frequent repetition tends to drive complicated actions deeper and deeper into the 
unconscious. 
But Butler's preferred interpretation of unconscious memory may need to be 
supplemented by other considerations that bespeak a multi-pronged activity which 
16 Butler declares, for instance, that `we grow our limbs as we do, and possess the instincts we possess, 
because we remember having grown our limbs in this way, and having had these instincts in past 
generations when we were in the persons of our forefathers - each individual life adding a small (but so 
small, in any one lifetime, as to be hardly appreciable) amount of new experience to the general store of 
memory; that we have thus got into certain habits which we can now rarely break; and that we do much 
of what we do unconsciously on the same principle as that (whatever it is) on which we do all other 
habitual actions, with the greater ease and unconsciousness the more often we repeat them.' Unconscious 
Memory. 
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includes, but does not reduce to, automatic recollections that are prompted by 
sequences of cues. That is to say, variation may result from a power or powers 
capable of satisfying felt needs and/or desires which may be forward- as well as 
backward-looking. Indeed, why not think there may be a whole complex of powers 
which are set in motion by a will to achieve a better attunement of the organism to 
the changing conditions of its environment? 
Inasmuch as we are speaking of an unconscious will to activate just and only those 
powers that can effect desirable changes, whatever satisfactions might ensue thus 
suggest the importance of another consideration---the possibility that evolution alludes 
in general to an evolving natural knowledge. For local desires to alter extant habits 
may bear witness to a will to deploy available powers with the vague aim of 
approaching ever closer to a Heraclitean Logos. Indeed, the Lamarckian view of 
evolution infuses the Cosmos with a telos, albeit a very vague one, inasmuch as 
inheritable alterations in extant habits generally imply an aim to  improve upon 
existing natural knowledge. For Butler can be read as conjecturing that evolution is 
bound up with a vague aim to expand a reservoir of wisdom whose roots perhaps 
extend backwards to the very origins of life, assuming this last idea makes sense. 
A further consideration is that unconscious memory may, in accordance with a 
polar logic, allude to intimately connected powers of remembering and forgetting. If 
this means there exists a power to remember selectively, for not everything that 
belongs to the species-typical chain of habits need to be relevant, so the power that 
the notion of unconscious memory elicits, the power of remembering may be much 
more complex than a power of automatic  recollection of formerly established 
habits.17  
Perhaps the most one can say is that each viable organism can be regarded as a 
potential carrier, if not creator, of a specific kind of natural wisdom, a wisdom that 
may or may not be evolving since there is no guarantee that variations will always 
prove to be in the long run happy or lucky ones.18 Furthermore, since any changes in 
17 Here he perhaps opens up a promising line of inquiry that may profit from Sheldrake's speculations 
concerning the nature of  morphogenesis in the creation of new habits, for Butler seems to be suggesting 
that once definite forms of organization come into existence, they become potential sources of influence 
on the becoming of similar systems. From the point of view of Butler's story-plan, however, it may be 
more fruitful to think about memory in terms of a reverse `formative causation'---that is, of having the 
power to render `present' aspects of the `past' through reenacting old habits, etc. a power that does not 
reside `outside' an organism but rather acts from `within'; that is, upon the store of unconscious 
memories to which every organism perhaps has access.  
18 The matter seems closely related to the true meaning of “natural selection”---which, according to 
Butler, `operates on what it finds, and not on what it has made. Animals that have been wise and lucky 
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habits that prove viable and inheritable arise out of `localized' felt needs and/or 
desires, this knowledge may be best regarded as evolving under the aegis of an over-
arching polarity of immanence-transcendence. Such a knowledge is only provisionally 
`objective' in a world which is forever `moving on.' Which is to say that the wisdom 
that Butler speaks of  may be evolving or devolving.  
But be that as it may, the point is that by hanging a good deal of his story of 
evolution on the hook of unconscious memory, Butler opens up a number of tricky 
questions that are, some of them anyway, not entirely devoid of empirical support. He 
cites, for instance, the findings of embryologists who inform us that an embryo 
reenacts a long history of evolutionary changes during the course of its individual 
development. He opines, for instance, that 
the small, structureless, impregnate ovum from which we have each one of us 
sprung, has a potential recollection of all that has happened to each one of its 
ancestors prior to the period at which any such ancestor has issued from the 
bodies of its progenitors - provided, that is to say, a sufficiently deep, or 
sufficiently often-repeated, impression has been made to admit of its being 
remembered at all. Each step of normal development will lead the impregnate 
ovum up to, and remind it of, its next ordinary course of action, in the same way 
as we, when we recite a well-known passage, are led up to each successive 
sentence by the sentence which has immediately preceded it.' Life and Habit. 
However, this conjecture, which seems to invest each cell of an embryo with a 
power of memory that I am suggesting is not self-evidently akin to a capacity for total 
recall, invites an even deeper exploration of the implications of Butler's  metaphorics. 
For insofar as the power of remembering is intimately bound up with many other 
closely related powers, such as powers of selection and/or decision, a power of 
remembering may be not only capable of sifting and weighing the reservoir of habits 
`stored' in unconscious memory for whatever might still be relevant for present 
purposes. It might even be partly creative. Indeed, Butler goes so far as to suggest that 
 [A person's] past selves are living in him at this moment with the accumulated 
life of centuries. ‘Do this, this, this, which we too have done, and found out 
profit in it,’ cry the souls of his forefathers within him. Faint are the far ones, 
coming and going as the sound of bells wafted on to a high mountain; loud and 
clear are the near ones, urgent as an alarm of fire. Unconscious Memory. 
But apart from this evocation of a critical-creative power, Butler is conceivably 
quite justified in holding that a good deal of the `content' of unconscious memory 
live longer and breed more than others less wise and lucky. Assuredly. The wise and lucky animals 
transmit their wisdom and luck...'. Life and Habit. 
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alludes to established, semi-continuous chains of characteristic instincts, which for him 
represent the best sort of knowledge.19 That is, a kind of knowledge that is 
incorporated into the very members of the species and so exhibited everywhere in the 
performance of the most ordinary activities, such as digesting and breathing. Or in 
species-typical skills such as those evidenced by a spider spinning a web, or by a 
growing embryo of a chick which recognizes that the time has come to peck its way 
out of its shell although noone as shown it how to do this. For we are speaking of  
performances that are least prone to err. This kind of knowledge is manifestly 
uncriticizable, for it refers to habits that have once been learned so well and have 
become so fixed that they can be unthinkingly and automatically acted upon, as well 
as having somehow become capable of being transmitted to the next generation.  
In sum, then, although an unconscious memory may well be the key to 
understanding inheritance, as Butler maintains, it is possible that it alludes to creative-
critical powers that work beneath the surface, so to speak, of the processes of variation 
with the aim to augment and/or alter the overt habits that constitute the living body 
of the existing Cosmos.20  Such powers are perhaps even capable of altering the 
direction of development or evolution of a species of organisms, which is a possibility 
that is in accord with the intrinsic openness entailed in the Lamarckian view of 
variation which elicits only a vague cosmic telos.  
Butler is essentially launching, in other words, an adventure in story-telling which 
in the end invites his readers to contemplate what appears to be the question of all 
questions: whether there must be some immaterial cosmic principle that induces living 
organisms to exercise their powers selectively in order to further their interests and 
thus perhaps the interests of an entire species. Put another way, the notion of 
variation in a truly vitalized cosmic setting may ultimately evoke a lot of `little wills' 
that launch into operation various `inner' powers that may belong as much to Nature 
as to the individual organism. All these individualized `little wills' may reflect in turn 
an overarching Will or cosmic Spirit that has, for reasons unknown, willed into 
19 An instinct, as Butler puts it, refers to `knowledge or habit acquired in past generations.' Again: `On 
the one hand, Instinct may be regarded as a kind of organised memory; on the other hand, Memory may 
be regarded as a kind of incipient instinct.' Luck, or Cunning?  
20 The point is that Butler's idea of `unconscious memory' calls for a much deeper investigation. This kind 
of memory evidently needs to be clearly distinguished from ordinary, human conscious memory in so far 
as the latter refers to repeated reconstructions, or re-representations, of past events. That is, instead of 
mainly (always?) arising out of frequent repetitions, as Butler maintains, unconscious memory could also 
refer to a hidden power or powers that can be likened to acts of direct intuiting---or perhaps better, 
intuitive imaginings of the sort that Coleridge alludes to when he posits a reality-producing power of 
`primary imagination.'  
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existence a World comprised of a great variety of evolving, self-limiting forms of more 
or less intelligent assemblages of mattering-mindings.  
To decide to follow Butler in his intrepid explorations of the `naturing of Nature,' 
is thus eventually to find oneself needing to decide not whether but rather how to use 
such taboo words as `soul' or `spirit.' For he indicates that one cannot rule out of 
order the possibility that the inherent vagueness of the telos of the `naturing of Nature' 
indicates a grand cosmic purpose which, however one interprets it, is conceivably an 
essentially spiritual one. For the very idea of quasi-intelligent organisms capable of 
assessing critically the viability of extant habits and creatively envisaging better ones, if 
only dimly, ultimately bespeaks a meaningful world informed by immaterial aims or 
values that are probably impossible to identify clearly and definitively.21  
5. ON THE MODERN ‘SOLUTION’ TO THE PROBLEM OF INHERITANCE   
So a long pause for reflection seems in order---one that might usefully attempt to  take 
into account whatever might be of significance to Butler of recent advances in modern 
biology. Indeed, many moderns might want to say that these developments have 
rendered Butler's speculations otiose. But this may be too swift a dismissal given the 
modern tendency to erect technical barriers that serve to block the sort of informal 
inquiry into the `naturing of Nature' that Butler illustrates. Indeed, a good many 
workers in the life sciences seem inclined to think that detailed studies in the field of 
genetics can resolve the problem of inheritance. Some even go so far as to claim that 
the discovery of the central role that the self-replicating molecule DNA plays in 
heredity means that modern science is on the threshold of discovering the secret of 
Life itself.  
But why think that the intricate details of molecular genetics could tell us much of 
importance about matters related to the meaning of Life and/or Thought? It seems to 
be one of the more entrenched and least challenged assumptions of the moderns that 
`explanations' should proceed from the bottom up, as it were. That is, in a manner 
21 These remarks touch on the question of how closely Butler actually follows Lamarck, for he himself 
observes that `the theory on which I had been insisting in Life and Habit was in reality an easy corollary 
[of Lamarck's] system, though one which he does not appear to have caught sight of. I saw also that his 
denial of design was only, so to speak, skin deep, and that his system was in reality teleological, inasmuch 
as, to use Isidore Geoffroy’s words, it makes the organism design itself. In making variations depend on 
changed actions, and these, again, on changed views of life, efforts, and designs, in consequence of 
changed conditions of life, he in effect makes effort, intention, will, all of which involve design (or at any 
rate which taken together involve it), underlie progress in organic development. True, he did not know 
he was a teleologist, but he was none the less a teleologist for this. He was an unconscious teleologist. 
Luck, or Cunning? 
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analogous to those detailed investigations into the structurings of `matter' that are 
pursued in high energy physics wherein ever more violent interventions at the level of 
atomic organization coupled with sophisticated applications of mathematics are 
assumed to be capable of revealing the secrets of the entire universe. The situation in 
the life sciences may merely reflect, in short, a continuation of the practice introduced 
by the early moderns---of silently and repeatedly chanting to themselves that concrete 
existents can be derived from abstract entities.  
This is not to suggest, however, that the remarkable properties of DNA have no 
bearing at all on the quest to understand heredity. For this molecule can, in the first 
and perhaps last instance, be regarded as Nature's way of dealing with the problem of 
`how to go on'----that is, how to transmit from parent to offspring some, if not all, of 
the knowledge that the species has accumulated over perhaps countless generations.  
Yet on the face of it, DNA seems to refer only to highly detailed instructions about 
how to construct the intricately related protein-based elements of the material bodies 
of the next generation of the species. So while the discovery of DNA undoubtedly has 
great significance for understanding certain details of the processes involved in 
heredity, it is hardly obvious that this molecule can take into account, for instance, 
that aspect of continuity in heredity that induces Butler to speak of `the unity of 
person between parents and offspring in successive generations.' Indeed, the mere 
mention of `person' gives rise to some very sticky questions, as we shall see later. 
At the very least, then, DNA perhaps refers only to an ingenious device that 
evidently relieves Nature of the bother of having to reinvent the wheel, as it were, 
over and over again. One might thus say that DNA `works' just because it is a fairly 
reliable (but evidently not perfect) mechanism for storing and transmitting a great 
deal of relevant and/or possibly useful information in the form of a flexible, and no 
doubt remarkably efficient, symbolism. Perhaps DNA is therefore best imaged as a 
kind of miniature but well-stocked library of instructions for creating the material 
bodies of new organisms. However, the trope of the library is also a timely reminder 
that not every page of every book in a given library is relevant to whatever building 
project is currently being undertaken. Some books may have long since lost their 
usefulness. Or perhaps they and their contents need to be shuffled about since they 
could be repositories of mistaken or misleading information that might be well lost 
altogether. Or at least interpreted in different ways in order to achieve different 
ends.22 
22 See, e.g., Mae-Won Ho's discussion of the `genetic paradigm,' which she describes of having collapsed 
`under the weight of its own momentum,' since research on the `reverse information flow' from the 
biosocial and physicochemical environment indicates that heredity involves non-random, directed 
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In other words, libraries call for critical-creative `readers' capable of interpreting a 
wealth of perhaps irrelevant and/or not necessarily clear and unambiguous 
symbolisms. So it is conceivable that DNA is only a skeletal part of a living memory 
system that is evidently designed to do more than merely physically connect one 
generation of a species of organism to the next generation. So the question arises: 
what can the workings of DNA  tell us about the non-physical, or immaterial, side of 
the possibly vital needs or desires that may lie close to the heart of the phenomenon of 
inheritance?  
This last question leads into an even more difficult question, such as whether new 
techniques/methods of building new organisms do not at times require the enlistment 
of a creative power or powers capable of inventing new forms `on the fly,' as it were. 
For even if the mechanism of DNA `works' in the sense of providing a reservoir of 
information that can be tapped into as occasion demands, the question still remains, 
who or what decides what parts, if any, of the available information is really relevant 
to current aims?  All that seems clear is that it would be quite futile to ask modern 
naturalists for answers to questions that most of them evidently prefer not even to 
entertain.   
6. AN ORGANISM IS A PSYCHO-PHYSICAL WHOLE   
I have suggested that it is to Butler's great credit that he in effect forces his readers to 
gradually confront a number of  discomfiting (for the moderns anyway)  possibilities 
that indicate that no attempt to account for evolution can do without presupposing a 
rough picture of a living Cosmos. He himself indicates that a primary consideration 
when tackling evolution is that this idea refers first and foremost to ongoing changes 
in what Owen Barfield usefully refers to as `psycho-physical wholes'.  
Being particularly interested in the evolution of consciousness, Barfield is 
especially critical of the tendency of the moderns to promote a conception of 
evolution wherein changes mainly take place in somatic units that are bereft of 
psychic components. Although the moderns have of late come round to 
acknowledging that experience refers to constructive activities that involve a subject 
capable of psychic activity, or a community of such subjects, they are regularly prone 
to forget this central factor of construction. The upshot is that standard 
interpretations of evolution may be suspected of perpetuating a stubborn bad sense 
genetic changes---which at least suggests that biology is gradually revealing the rationality of Lamarck's 
basic propositions.  
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about sense-making itself which has resulted in, as Barfield puts it, `a morass of self-
deception that is paralyzing our wills.'23  
For it makes no sense to suppose that evolution refers to the development of 
increasingly complex but essentially insentient somatic units. That is, until the sudden 
appearance on the cosmic scene of homo sapiens whereby all of a sudden a kind of 
super-animal appears in Nature, one that happens to be gifted with a special 
`property' called consciousness. On the contrary, Barfield claims, this self-limiting 
view of evolution betrays a mental paralysis, for consciousness is more coherently 
viewed as a late development in an ongoing evolution of psycho-physical wholes. Or 
perhaps better still, as a gradual development in respect to both kind and degree of  
increasingly complex sensibilities which are at bottom dynamic assemblages of living 
forms of organized mattering-mindings.  
  
In which case, it is not too hard to imagine that the vague idea of consciousness is 
applicable at all levels of sentience---from the lowest or most primitive level of psycho-
physical habits (where a low-grade form of consciousness exists in a state of latency) to 
the emergence of human organisms at the highest level of extant sensibilities (wherein 
an advanced form of sentience is manifested in self-consciousness).   
 
Thus when he insists that `the whole of nature is psychophysical,'24 Barfield 
proffers  an especially important form of support for Butler's rough image of a living 
Cosmos. This idea is in fact consonant with the even more suggestive conjecture that 
there is a critical-creative side to variation which is bound up with the polarity of 
remembering and forgetting.25 Furthermore, by framing a story about evolution in 
terms of psycho-physical wholes, one can think of evolution as an intrinsically  slow 
cosmic process. That is, it can be likened to a tentative and cautious cosmic 
experiment wherein organisms bent on making changes in their forms of life strive to 
achieve harmonious assemblages of new equilibriums which are not too disruptive of 
closely related, neighbouring equilibriums. For the vague telos that Butler elicits may 
23 See “Self and Reality,” in Owen Barfield, The Rediscovery of Meaning and Other Essays (Middletown, 
Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1977), pp. 155-75, esp. p. 162. Lending support to one of Butler's main 
ideas, Barfield observes that `if a memory is not an “acquired characteristic,” it would be difficult to say 
what it is!' ( p. 166). 
24 Ibid. p. 163. 
25 That a power of remembering goes hand in hand with a power of forgetting is consonant with the idea 
that creativity is central to processes of variation, as Barfield indicates when he notes that a faculty of 
forgetting is necessary in order to have genuine creativity. See “Self and Reality,” pp. 173-75.  
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well be, as he in places indicates, as much critical as it is conservative; that is, aware 
that willed powers are inherently prone to err. Indeed, Butler observes that 
[s]lowly, step by step, the many blunders and mischances which have worked 
together for good to those that have persevered in elasticity. They have travelled 
as man has travelled, with but little perception of a want till there was also some 
perception of a power, and with but little perception of a power till there was a 
dim sense of want; want stimulating power, and power stimulating want; and 
both so based upon each other that no one can say which is the true foundation, 
but rather that they must be both baseless and, as it were, meteoric in mid air. 
They have seen very little ahead of a present power or need, and have been then 
most moral, when most inclined to pierce a little into futurity, but also when 
most obstinately declining to pierce too far, and busy mainly with the present. 
They have been so far blindfolded that they could see but for a few steps in front 
of them, yet so far free to see that those steps were taken with aim and definitely, 
and not in the dark. Life and Habit. 
One is thus led to wonder if current thinking in ecology is another confirmation of 
an incipient wisdom in Nature which fosters a sub-conscious awareness in, alas, only 
some organisms that too abrupt a change `here' can have disastrous consequences 
`there.' Slight variations, by the same token, may also bespeak an essentially moral 
concern not to put too many of Nature's already established equilibriums into 
jeopardy.26 Such a possibility is moreover also in keeping with the view that the 
human organism may indeed be worthy of the adjective `higher' on account of its 
having the at least latent capacity to be moved by `immaterial concerns'--- such as 
those exemplified by all the moral, ethical, aesthetic, and religious conundrums that 
make human life so complicated. 
The point seems implicit in another of Barfield's observations. For he claims that 
`after the appearance of homo sapiens [evolution] became also the story of a changing 
reciprocal relation between the psychic and physical components.'27 Thus by stressing 
the importance of paying special attention to the evolution of human consciousness, 
which he holds is best studied in the history of changes in the use and meanings of 
words, Barfield indicates that the material side of evolution becomes less important 
than the mental side as one moves higher in the scale of sensibility. This indicates that 
Butler is indeed on the right track inasmuch as he holds that the ascendancy of the 
Darwinian view of evolution betokens a degenerate form of thinking that is marked by 
26 `Wherever there is life there is a moral government of rewards and punishments understood by the 
amœba neither better nor worse than by man. The history of organic development is the history of a 
moral struggle.' Evolution, Old and New. 
27 “Self and Reality,” p. 167.  
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dishonesty and self-deception. Which is to say that the evolution of human 
consciousness ought to stand near the top of the list of the concerns of any would-be 
cultural physician who worries about the mental health of the culture he/she lives in.  
7. SELVES AND SOULS 
Assuming, then, that the evolution of degrees of sensibility has led to the emergence  
of self-consciousness, it is perhaps just at this point that one arrives at what may be the 
most significant of Butler's bold speculations. In his exploration of the relationships 
that connect his initial trio of tropes (habit, power, and memory), he eventually makes 
explicit reference to another, perhaps even more important trope---namely, that of a 
self. This trope can even be said to supervene over the other three. It elicits the image 
of a `quickened' body comprised of more or less fixed habits and invested with certain 
powers for changing them, a situation that surely evokes a vitally concerned embodied 
self. While being a thoroughly familiar notion, the trope of self, however, embraces a 
number of very slippery ideas, such as person, personality, personal identity, and, last 
but perhaps far from least, a unique soul.  
Indeed, Butler asks whether it is possible  
to avoid imagining that if we have within us so many tributary souls, so utterly 
different from the soul which they unite to form, that they neither can perceive 
us, nor we them, though it is in us that they live and move and have their being, 
and though we are what we are, solely as the result of their co-operation - is it 
possible to avoid imagining that we may be ourselves atoms, undesignedly 
combining to form some vaster being, though we are utterly incapable of 
perceiving that any such being exists, or of realising the scheme or scope of our 
own combination? Life and Habit. 
But he also presents his readers with the puzzle of whether there is a difference, and if 
so how one might distinguish, between the idea of a personality and that of a soul. He 
gestures here toward an even more profound question---such as whether or not the 
would-be naturalist needs to find a way to fit a great variety of kinds of souls into 
Nature. For he observes that   
we are in the habit of considering that our personality, or soul, no matter where 
it begins or ends, and no matter what it comprises, is nevertheless a single thing, 
uncompounded of other souls. Yet there is nothing more certain than that this is 
not at all the case, but that every individual person is a compound creature, 
being made up of an infinite number of distinct centres of sensation and will, 
each one of which is personal, and has a soul and individual existence, a 
reproductive system, intelligence, and memory of its own, with probably its 
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hopes and fears, its times of scarcity and repletion, and a strong conviction that 
it is itself the centre of the universe. Life and Habit. 
Given the anthropomorphic nature of Butler's metaphorics, there is no problem 
in linking the notion of a self to a living person, and thus a peculiar personality. The 
latter notion is, however, probably impossible to define and/or clarify with systematic 
precision, as Butler in fact maintains. It is thus necessary to approach this obscure 
matter on the slant, as it were---by first noting, for instance, that a personality alludes 
to the individual `selfhoodness' of some particular person. But then this move only 
elicits the even more elusive idea of personal identity. For a person bespeaks a certain 
continuity, but of what? Here the idea of personal identity, which Butler favours, 
threatens to be highly misleading inasmuch as what is being referenced is not absolute 
sameness (as Butler in fact holds) but rather only a certain continuity of character that 
can vary widely over a lifetime as well as between individuals of a particular species.  
Indeed, it is just this elusive factor of continuity that seems to make the very idea 
of inheritance so difficult to elucidate. So instead of concentrating on the `exterior' 
manifestations of a personality, it may be better to contemplate the hidden source or 
seat of the powers that are responsible for the nature of these manifestations. That is 
to say, a certain type of personality can be conceived as the peculiar expression of an 
undefinable and hidden `inner something' that might as well be called a soul. There 
may be nothing for it, in other words, but to emulate Butler's boldness and hazard the 
conjecture that whatever happens to be expressed in the guise of a certain personality 
depends on the nature and quality of the `inner' powers to which the expression bears 
witness, powers whose seat of operation elicits the idea of a more or less well-
cultivated soul.  
For this very obscure notion may be required in the end to account for the factor 
of continuity which cannot be supplied by either the notion of a personality or the 
idea of personal identity. This factor of continuity may wax and wane, but it need not 
come and go like a light that can be switched on and off. For a certain continuity can 
be ascribed to a perduring soul which remains vital throughout sleep, or periods of 
unconsciousness, even though it need not remain constant from the cradle to the 
grave. It may even, who knows, persist after death, for this consideration too poses a 
problem for  anyone who contemplates personal identity.28 
28 In a long discussion of the matter of continuity, Butler remarks on `how difficult is it to say where 
identity begins or ends, or again where death begins or ends, or where reproduction begins or ends.' Or 
again, `Assuredly, there is more birth and death in the world than is dreamt of by the greater part of us; 
but it is so masked, and on the whole, so little to our purpose, that we fail to see it. Yet radical and 
sweeping as the changes of organism above described must be, we do not feel them to be more a bar to 
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Hence the question arises whether Butler's picture of a living Cosmos is 
particularly valuable just because it exposes the need to take a long view of the 
worlding of the world which gives as much weight to the immaterial side of 
experience as to the material side. Perhaps the quality of the former depends on the 
condition of the more or less vital souls that are evoked by the very idea of power. For 
different personalities may bespeak different degrees of vitality according to the 
degree of cultivation of `inner' powers which may be only partly developed inasmuch 
as they are endowments from Nature that are given only in a state of latency.  
8. ON FRAMING A TRULY VITALISTIC STORY ABOUT EVOLUTION 
But whether or not this line of thought is capable of being rendered more cogent, the 
main point here is that Butler opens up the important, albeit very difficult, 
problematic of what it means to live and think well. That is to say, in choosing to tie 
the idea of variation to a Lamarckian view of the organic world, which imbues the 
Cosmos with a vague telos, Butler in the end obliges the aspiring nonmodern naturalist 
to entertain that question of all philosophical questions---whether the idea of 
`goodness' in thinking tout court ought to be understood in the first instance as referring 
to the more or less cooperative actions of responsible, healthy souls.  
Or to put this another way, Butler's aim to give a vitalistic account of Evolution 
shows there is no avoiding such difficult and controversial cosmic questions as `What 
is the relationship, if any, between Nature and Spirit?' At the same time, he indicates 
that the price for refusing to stray beyond the borders mapped by science to seek for 
insights into the `naturing of Nature' is bound to be very high indeed. It may in fact 
be as high as Bernard Shaw prophesized in his defence of Butler's writings on 
evolution. For in expanding upon certain aspects of Butler's critique of the Darwinian 
approach, Shaw presciently noted (in 1921) that the Darwinian doctrine has fostered 
`a European catastrophe of a magnitude so appalling...that it is still far from certain 
whether our civilization will survive it.'29 
All told, then, by tacitly hinging his story on an exploration of a bevy of tropes 
over which it would seem that of a self supervenes, Butler proffers a sketch of the 
Cosmos as a vast stage upon which a great variety of actors exhibiting greater or lesser 
degrees of sensibility come and go---for reasons unknown and very likely unknowable. 
Yet one can nonetheless image the Cosmos as a vast dance wherein it is not possible 
personal identity than the considerable changes which take place in the structure of our own bodies 
between youth and old age.' Life and Habit. 
29 There are few more eloquent critiques of the cultural damage that has stemmed from the doctrine of 
neo-Darwinism than Bernard Shaw's preface to his Back to Methuselah.  
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to clearly tell the dancers from the dance, for this depicts an undirected and often 
violent interplay of occasions of sensibility that are only infrequently wise, benevolent, 
or generous. Yet although all this activity may appear at times to amount to nothing 
more than a pointless farce played out on a `great stage of fools,' the drama of the 
Cosmos is not necessarily pointless, or even tragic. That is, if Butler is right and the 
general character of the naturing of Nature bespeaks a potentially evolving wisdom.  
So it would be well to note that Butler is by no means suggesting that his 
Lamarckian interpretation of emergence entails a steady progress in the evolution of 
Nature: 
Lamarck’s wonderful conception was hampered by an unnecessary adjunct, 
namely, a belief in an inherent tendency towards progressive development in 
every low organism. He was thus driven to account for the presence of many 
very low and very ancient organisms at the present day, and fell back upon the 
theory, which is not yet supported by evidence, that such low forms are still 
continually coming into existence from inorganic matter. But there seems no 
necessity to suppose that all low forms should possess an inherent tendency 
towards progression. It would be enough that there should occasionally arise 
somewhat more gifted specimens of one or more original forms. These would 
vary, and the ball would be thus set rolling, while the less gifted would remain in 
status quo, provided they were sufficiently gifted to escape extinction. Life and 
Habit. 
And to be sure, whatever light Butler's kind of story-telling can throw on certain 
fundamental aspects of the `naturing of Nature is bound to be somewhat dimmed by 
the vexed question of the meaning of `rightness' in respect to acts of metaphoring. Yet 
he shows that the first and and perhaps most important lesson that the would-be 
naturalist needs to learn is that there is no way to avoid venturing into a vast and 
trackless domain where the most reliable guide can only be a perspicacious choice of 
guiding imagery. However, by suggesting that the best sort of imagery must be 
anthropomorphic in character, Butler appears to have been only intuitively aware 
that what is needed in natural philosophy is an essentially poetical metaphysics. 
Indeed, he observes that 
 We know nothing as yet about the origin of a creature able to feel want and 
power, nor yet what want and power spring from. It does not seem worth while 
to go into these questions until an understanding has been come to as to whether 
the interaction of want and power in some low form or forms of life which could 
assimilate matter, reproduce themselves, vary their actions, and be capable of 
remembering, will or will not suffice to explain the development of the varied 
organs and desires which we see in the higher vertebrates and man. When this 
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question has been settled, then it will be time to push our inquiries farther back. 
Evolution, Old and New. 
Yet Butler has actually taken great strides, I have been maintaining, in this 
`pushing back' since he proffers the outlines of a highly promising anthropomorphic 
imaginary that is capable of doing at least some justice to Lamarck's best insights, if 
such they be. Expressing these insights in terms of certain attributes of a sentient self, 
Barfield indicates that each living organism needs to be conceived in the end as 
invested with at least a modicum of spirit. Or perhaps one should say that he sets the 
stage for viewing living bodies as assemblages of enspirited forms of mattering-
minding. Or then again, it might be better to refer to the various forms of  mattering-
mindings intrinsic to the `naturing of Nature' as imbued with more or less inspirited 
souls.30  
To attempt to settle such a questions, Butler also indicates, is inevitably to be 
obliged to engage in the sort of poetic activity that Nietzsche alludes to when he 
indicates that the would-be nonmodern naturalist has much to learn from creative 
poets. It is therefore small wonder that Butler has remained virtually invisible in 
debates about the meaning of evolution, even to those thinkers who are prepared to 
acknowledge that the human organism's immaterial concerns are just as relevant to 
philosophy of nature as its material concerns.  
As I indicated at the outset, a protest against a pervasive delusory faith in the 
unlimited scope of science is behind Butler's contrarian insistence that professional 
thinkers are very unlikely to be the most reliable metaphysical thinkers. Underscoring 
this general criticism, Butler ultimately demonstrates the need for a thorough 
overhaul, if not rejection, of the modern faith in logic.31 He leaves his readers 
therefore with a problem that is closely related to his decision to attempt to elucidate 
evolution using a particular choice of metaphorics, or metaphysical imaginary. 
Whether or not his choice can be justified and/or amplified is therefore a major 
30 Butler asks, for instance: `Shall we see God henceforth as embodied in all living forms; as dwelling in 
them; as being that power in them whereby they have learnt to fashion themselves, each one according 
to its ideas of its own convenience, and to make itself not only a microcosm, or little world, but a little 
unwritten history of the universe from its own point of view into the bargain?' Evolution, Old and New. 
31 `[I]f we are to think fluently and harmoniously upon any subject into which change enters (and there is 
no conceivable subject into which it does not), we must begin by flying in the face of every rule that 
professors of the art of thinking have drawn up for our instruction. These rules may be good enough as 
servants, but we have let them become the worst of masters, forgetting that philosophy is made for man, 
not man for philosophy. Logic has been the true Tower of Babel, which we have thought to build so that 
we might climb up into the heavens, and have no more miracle, but see God and live - nor has confusion 
of tongues failed to follow on our presumption.' Luck, or Cunning? 
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challenge to those who might be inclined to think that he represents a fond but 
ultimately foolish hope to think that a better story about evolution might result in 
some improvement in Life and Thought. But the only firm conclusion that can be 
maintained here is that Butler's many hints to this effect provide reason enough to 
think that his line of thought is well worth pursuing further, and this I shall attempt in 
a subsequent essay.  
 






* The second part of this paper will be publishing in a later edition of Cosmos & 
History. 
 
 
